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I compare welfare generated by a credit contract with individual liability
and a contract with joint liability. The problem is credit rationing caused
by limited liability and unobservable investment decisions. Joint liability in-
duces borrowers to monitor each other, however the lender can also monitor.
I show that wealthier borrowers may prefer riskier investments when liability
is joint, which causes the lender to oﬀer them smaller loans than he would
if liability were individual, even if he cannot monitor the individual-liability
loan. Therefore, wealthier borrowers prefer individual-liability loans. The
result may explain why small businesses grow larger when funded with in-
dividual rather than with joint-liability loans. Poorer borrowers may prefer
joint-liability loans, because borrowers monitor more eﬃciently, even when
their monitoring technology is the same as the lender’s, making joint-liability
loans cheaper.
JEL Codes: C21, C72, D82, I38, O16
keywords: joint liability, peer monitoring, credit rationing, group loans
1. Introduction
Joint liability in credit contracts has received a lot of attention in recent years.
Borrowers linked by joint liability have to help repay the debt of any one of them
who does not repay fully.1 Microcredit lenders, such as the Grameen Bank, rely
∗I am especially grateful to Eric Maskin and Abhijit Banerjee for guidance and detailed
comments. I also thank Glenn Ellison, Jonathan Morduch and Tomas Sjöström for helpful
discussions. The usual disclaimer applies. Email address: mm1174@columbia.edu
1Lenders who use the contract, typically ask borrowers to self-select into groups of five to
seven members.
primarily on this contract to oﬀer small loans to low-income business owners,
and they credit the contract with their success in lending to people who had
been shunned by formal lenders. The World Bank and other international orga-
nizations channel most of their large financial support for microcredit into group
lending programs.2 A number of academic papers have identified advantages of
joint liability, explaining some of the popularity.3 However, the spotlight also il-
luminates a puzzle. Given the advantages, why has joint liability not spread more
widely, for example to commercial banks? More problematically, why do some
microcredit lenders use only individual-liability loans, in which each borrower is
only responsible for her own loan, while serving very similar borrowers? Their
record looks no less successful. The contribution in this paper is to determine for
whom joint liability is optimal.
Lenders who use individual-liability loans look no diﬀerent than do group
lenders when judged by repayment rates and they tend to be more profitable.4
The record of individual and group lending programs seems to diﬀer mainly in
the impact which they have on their borrowers’ businesses and on their access to
credit.
Two ”stylized facts” emerge from anecdotal evidence. First, lenders who use
individual-liability loans seem to have a better record of funding small businesses
which grow and raise their owners’ incomes.5 Businesses funded with group loans
tend to remain small and the owners remain poor. Second, the poorest borrowers
served by group lending programs are often poorer than the poorest clients of
individual lenders. The model below oﬀers explanations for both of the obser-
vations. It has a simple and important policy implication. Currently almost all
microcredit lenders oﬀer only one type of contract, joint or individual, and most
lenders use the former. Borrowers would be better oﬀ if lenders oﬀered a choice
of contracts, since the poorer among them may benefit more from joint-liability
loans while the wealthier benefit more if loans are individual.
I assume that contracts are enforceable, therefore the incentive problem is
whether the borrower is able to repay the loan, not whether she is willing. Two
2In 1997, a consortium of policy makers pledged to raise $20 billion to increase the reach of
microcredit to 100 million poor households by 2005. (Morduch [34])
3Examples are Besley and Coate [11], Ghatak [18] Armendáriz de Aghion [4], Armendáriz de
Aghion and Golier [5], Stiglitz [38], Varian [42], Conning [15]. I discuss papers which describe
shortcomings of joint liability later in the introduction.
4The better lenders, both individual and group, have repayment rates as high as 95%. Fewer
lenders are profitable, for example Banco Sol in Bolivia, which uses group loans, Bank Rakyat
Indonesia, which uses individual loans, ADEMI in the Dominican Republic, which uses both.
See Christen, Rhyne and Vogel [14], Otero and Rhyne [35], and Morduch [34].
5See Otero and Rhyne [35] and Pirela Martínez [36] for anecdotal evidence, and Madajewicz
[32] for econometric evidence.
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identical borrowers invest in one of two risky projects. The safe project has a
higher probability of success than the risky project, but the risky project yields
a larger return if it succeeds. However, the risky project does not succeed of-
ten enough to allow the lender to break even. Neither the lender nor the other
borrower observe which project a borrower chose. There is limited liability. Bor-
rowers’ wealth is not suﬃcient to repay a loan that maximizes expected project
returns.
The problem from the lender’s point of view is that the borrower wants to
choose the risky project, because the punishment for failure is limited by the avail-
able wealth.6 The incentive problem results in credit rationing. The lender oﬀers
a smaller loan than the borrower would like, since, as seems reasonable, a larger
loan makes the risky project more attractive. Two instruments, collateral and
monitoring, allow the lender to punish the borrower for choosing the risky project
and therefore oﬀer a larger loan. Collateral depends on wealth. Monitoring may
reveal which project a borrower chose, allowing the monitor to confiscate returns
if the project was the risky one. The expectation of the punishment dissuades
the borrower from choosing the risky project. Monitoring is costly.
The first result is that wealthier borrowers may prefer the individual-liability
contract even if the lender cannot monitor, because the unmonitored individual
loan may be larger and no cost of monitoring is incurred. The result is unexpected
for the following reason. Whether liability is joint or individual determines who
monitors. When borrowers are linked by joint liability and one of them switches
from the safe to the risky project, the probability that her partner will have
to pay the liability rises, since a borrower cannot repay fully when her project
fails. This gives the partner an incentive to monitor, since borrowers will choose
the safe project only if threatened with the punishment which monitoring makes
possible. Borrowers have no incentive to monitor when liability is individual.7 In
a group contract, they may monitor and choose the safe project even when each
of them obtains a loan that would cause each to choose the risky project if the
contract were individual, because they want to avoid having to pay the liability.8
This eﬀect is the reason why Stiglitz [38] concludes that joint liability can always
increase welfare by increasing the size of the loan if monitoring is costless for the
borrowers, while the lender cannot monitor.
Joint liability has another eﬀect, however. The liability imposes risk. If
6The eﬀect is in the spirit of the analysis in Stiglitz and Weiss [39].
7The only punishment for choosing the risky project in the individual contract is the loss of
collateral. This punishment does not diﬀerentiate the two contracts, since it is also present in
the group contract.
8Whether or not the borrowers do monitor and choose the safe project depends on the terms
of the contract.
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a borrower’s project succeeds in a group, her payoﬀ depends on her partner’s
outcome. If her partner’s project succeeds, she obtains a high payoﬀ. Otherwise,
she has to pay the liability. I will refer to this outcome as the bad state. In
an individual contract, a borrower receives a high payoﬀ if her project succeeds,
regardless of the other borrower’s outcome. The payoﬀ in the bad state depends
on which project the borrower chose. Since the risky project has a higher return
when it succeeds, it mitigates the risk imposed by the liability by raising the payoﬀ
in the bad state. This eﬀect makes the risky project more attractive than the
safe project to borrowers in a group, but it is absent from an individual contract,
therefore it reduces the size of a group loan relative to an individual one.
The risk imposed by joint liability matters when borrowers are risk-averse
and monitoring is costly. If monitoring is costless for the borrowers, an in Stiglitz
[38], joint liability can always raise utility. Consider a marginal increase in the
payment in the bad state, starting from a payment which does not depend on the
other borrower’s outcome. Such a marginal liability will elicit some monitoring
and therefore can increase the size of the loan. The risk which it imposes has
only a second-order eﬀect, because the utility function is linear around a point.
However, when monitoring is costly, such a marginal liability may not induce
monitoring. A larger liability imposes risk.
Under natural conditions, the eﬀect of monitoring dominates when borrowers
are very poor, but the eﬀect of risk imposed by joint liability dominates above
some level of wealth. The contract in which the lender cannot monitor may not
be of interest in itself. However, the result implies that wealthier borrowers prefer
individual-liability loans when the lender can monitor.
The second contribution in this paper is a reason for delegating monitoring
to the poorer borrowers. I show that borrowers are more eﬃcient monitors than
is the lender even when the lender and the borrowers have access to the same
monitoring technology. Therefore, joint liability loans are cheaper.
Existing literature commonly assumes that the lender cannot monitor.9 While
this assumption is useful for highlighting the advantages of joint liability, lenders
do monitor in practice.10 The assumption is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for
the joint-liability contract to be preferred.
The intuition for the second result is that allocating the task of monitoring
to the lender distorts the incentive to choose the safe project. By assumption,
borrowers cannot repay the loan fully unless the project succeeds. Suppose that
9Banerjee et al [7], Itoh [27], Stiglitz [38], Varian [42]
10Also, anecdotal sources report that the borrowers’ main complaint about joint liability loans
is the high cost of monitoring, which raises the question whether the borrowers have a better
monitoring technology than does the lender. (Otero and Rhyne [35])
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the joint and the individual-liability contracts oﬀer the same size loan. In order
to allow the lender to break even, the payment made when the project succeeds
must be higher in the individual contract to allow the lender to recover the cost of
his monitoring, which he incurs in the individual but not in the group contract.
If the lender wants to extract more surplus, he must raise the payment in the
case of success even further. The cost of the lender’s monitoring is a tax on
success, which makes the risky project more attractive, therefore requiring more
monitoring. If the borrowers monitor, the cost of monitoring comes from their
labor endowment. Since it does not have to be paid out of limited wealth, it does
not matter whether the project succeeds or fails, and there is no eﬀect on the
choice of project.
The model helps to explain the two stylized facts which motivate the analy-
sis. Small businesses grow more if funded with individual-liability loans, because
individual loans may be larger than group loans for wealthier borrowers, allow-
ing these borrowers to invest more.11 Joint-liability loans may be larger and
less costly for poorer borrowers, potentially explaining why the poorest clients
of group lending programs are poorer than those served by individual-liability
lenders.12
In another paper, I use data from Bangladesh to show that the explanation
may be empirically important.13 In the data, group loans are larger than in-
dividual loans only for the poorest among rural borrowers. Furthermore, the
diﬀerence in loan size aﬀects business profits. The somewhat wealthier borrow-
ers earn smaller profits when the lender uses group loans than when loans are
individual. I present descriptive statistics in section 5.
Several other papers describe shortcomings of joint liability. Banerjee et al [7]
also consider the moral hazard problem when contracts are enforceable, and they
show that peer monitoring may cause borrowers to choose projects which are too
safe. Besley and Coate [11] assume that contracts are not enforceable, and they
show that joint liability can either increase or decrease the probability of repay-
ment relative to individual liability. Neither paper determines which contract is
optimal. Rai and Sjöström [37] assume that contracts are not enforceable and
they show that joint liability by itself does not motivate borrowers to help repay
each other’s loans at an eﬃcient level. Borrowers should also send reports about
each other to the lender.
11As I noted earlier in the introduction, almost all microcredit lenders oﬀer only one type of
contract, either the group or the individual one, and, typically, borrowers in a given area only
have access to one lender. Hence this implication.
12The individual loan available to a very poor person may be either not worth taking or not
worth oﬀering given transaction costs of processing a loan.
13Madajewicz [32]
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. In section 3, I determine the welfare-maximizing terms of an individual-
liability and a joint-liability contract. In section 4, I characterize the optimal loan
contract as a function of wealth. Section 5 presents descriptive evidence. Section
6 concludes.
2. The model
I analyze a one-period, principal-agent model, with two identical, risk-averse
agents (borrowers) and one risk-neutral principal (the lender). I consider two
borrowers in order to allow contracts in which borrowers monitor each other, and
only two borrowers for simplicity.
Each borrower has some amount of wealth, w, which is observable and veri-
fiable to all parties. Each borrower has an investment opportunity in which she
would like to invest more than w.
I assume that contracts are enforceable. The incentive problem is the choice
of project, which determines whether or not the borrower will be able to repay,
not strategic default.
2.1. Projects
Each borrower chooses between a safe project which yields a return Rs(L) with
probability ps and zero otherwise, and a risky project which yields Rr(L) with
probability pr and zero if it fails, where pr < ps. L is the size of the loan.
Rj(L) is a continuous, at least once-diﬀerentiable function. Each project
requires a minimum investment, Ls for the safe project and Lr for the risky
project. Rj(Lj) = 0, j = r, s and R

j(L) > 0 ∀L > Lj , j = r, s. Assume that
Lr > Ls. One reason may be that the risky project is more capital-intensive.
I will make assumptions which will imply that Rr(L) > Rs(L). This can only
hold for some range of loan sizes if Lr > Ls(see Figure 1). Define L as the loan size
for which the returns to the safe and risky project are equal, i.e. Rs(L) = Rr(L).
Define L as the loan size which maximizes the net return to the safe project,
Rs(L)− ρ > 0 ∀L < L and Rs(L)− ρ < 0 ∀L > L
The range of loan sizes which is relevant for my analysis is L < L < L. The
reason for this structure will become clearer below.
Rj(L) is observable only to the borrower undertaking the project. However,
everyone knows (costlessly) whether a project succeeded or failed and this in-
formation is verifiable, i.e. everyone knows whether the amount available to the
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borrower for repayment is w or Rs(L) + w, but not whether Rr(L) + w is avail-
able.14
I assume that the risky project yields a larger expected net return to a bor-
rower who has no wealth.
A.1 psU(Rs(L)− ρL) < prU(Rr(L)− ρL) ∀L such that L < L < L
where U(·) is a continuous, twice-diﬀerentiable function and U(0) = 0, U  > 0,
U  < 0. ρ is the opportunity cost of the loan funds. If the assumption holds
for ρ, it will hold for any interest rate which must be higher than ρ. Also, the
safe project is worth funding, while the risky project yields a negative expected
return.
A.2 psRs(L)− ρL > 0 ∀L such that L < L < L
A.3 prRr(L)− ρL < 0 ∀L such that L < L < L
Claim 1: Assumptions A.1and A.3 together imply that Rr(L) > Rs(L) ∀L
such that L < L < L.
Proof : Fix L. Suppose that Rs(L) = Rr(L) and replace Rr(L) with Rs(L) in
the inequality in assumption A.1. Then the inequality can be rewritten in
the following way
(ps − pr)U(Rs(L)− ρL) < 0
Then the inequality cannot hold because A.3 implies that the argument
of the utility function must be positive. Since the right-hand-side of the
inequality in A.1 must be larger than it is when Rs(L) = Rr(L), it must be
true that Rr(L) > Rs(L).
The incentive problem is in the spirit of the analysis in Stiglitz and Weiss
[39].15 It is due to limited liability. A borrower who has no wealth prefers the
risky project to the safe project, because she has to repay only if the project
succeeds and the safe project is more likely to succeed. At the same time, the
risky project yields a larger return if it succeeds. However, the lender does not
want to fund the risky project.
14A motivation for this information structure is that a coarser signal, such as whether a
business exists or not, may be more easily observable than is a finer one which reveals the exact
return and/or the riskiness of the project. The borrower can aﬀect the riskiness of her investment
in many ways which are diﬃcult to observe and which she prefers to hide from the lender, such
as the choice of strategy, choice of inputs, etc.
15Allowing for a continuous probability distribution of project returns, as Stiglitz and Weiss
[39] do, would make the model more complicated to solve without adding insight.
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Note that I only consider the case of risk-averse borrowers. Risk aversion does
not cause the incentive problem. In fact it mitigates it, since more risk-averse
borrowers will have weaker preferences for the risky project, i.e. an increase in
risk aversion raises the left-hand-side of A.1 relative to the right-hand-side. Risk
aversion will be essential to the trade-oﬀ between the individual-liability and the
joint-liability contract.
Assumptions A.2 and A.3 imply that the expected return from the safe project
is larger than that from the risky project,
psRs(L) > prRr(L) ∀L such that L < L < L
Assumption A.4 guarantees that the incentive problem grows with loan size.
A.4 prR

r(L) ≥ psRs(L) ∀L such that L < L < L
The assumption implies that if the borrower is indiﬀerent between the safe and
the risky project, and the lender increases the loan size while holding collateral
fixed, the borrower will choose the risky project.16
The fact that psRs(L) > prRr(L) ∀L such that L < L < L together with A.4
imply that Lr > Ls. This implication together with Claim 1 are the reasons why
project returns have the structure presented in Figure 1.
The model is quite structured. However, it is the simplest model in which
one can show the diﬀerence between the individual-liability and the joint-liability
contract. Limited liability does not always give rise to credit rationing. As-
sumptions 1 - 4 and 5 (below) ensure that the analysis treats the case in which
borrowers do face credit rationing because they cannot oﬀer suﬃcient collateral.
Otherwise, the comparison between individual and joint liability is uninteresting.
The assumption that borrowers are risk-averse is essential as will become clear in
section 4.1.
2.2. Limited liability
The maximum which the borrower can pay in any state of the world is her wealth
plus any return to the project. I assume that wealth varies over a range, w ⊂
[0, w]. The next assumption states that a borrower who can oﬀer w as collateral
will still choose the risky project if oﬀered a loan size L.
A.5 psU(Rs(L)− ρL+ w) < prU(Rr(L)− ρL+ w)
16The assumption is stronger than necessary for the results.
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Thus, at each level of wealth there exists some eL < L, such that for L > eL the
borrower chooses the risky project. Since the lender will not oﬀer a loan which
causes the borrower to choose the risky project, A.5 confines the analysis to the
case in which borrowers are facing credit rationing due to limited liability.
2.3. The monitoring technology
Monitoring technology consists of gathering information and imposing punish-
ment. The monitor observes the actions of the borrower before returns are re-
alized. That is she observes the project which the borrower is choosing as the
borrower implements the project. The monitor punishes the borrower for choos-
ing the risky project after the returns are realized. The borrower knows how
much she is being monitored and she takes the expected punishment into account
in choosing the project. Therefore, monitoring serves to prevent the borrower
from choosing the risky project.17
The monitoring technology is stochastic. The monitor detects that the bor-
rower is choosing the risky project with some probability, b < 1. She learns
nothing with probability (1 − b). If she determines that the borrower chose the
risky project, she can impose a punishment of size d in utility units. The expected
punishment which the borrower faces is b× d. The monitor chooses the certainty
equivalent, c, of the expected punishment, i.e. the monitor chooses c = CE(b×d).
Imposing c costs the monitor W (c). W (c) is a continuous, at least once-
diﬀerentiable function, W (c) > 0 and W (c) ≥ 0.
The monitor can vary the expected punishment faced by the borrower by
varying b or d. The monitor can alter b by visiting the borrower’s business more
often, spending more time and being more inquisitive during the visits. I will
interpret d as confiscation of the return to the risky project. The typical assump-
tion in literature on group loans is that other borrowers impose social sanctions
against any borrower who misbehaves. In this interpretation, d is the disutility
associated with the exclusion from benefits associated with social networks, e.g.
getting help from one’s neighbors or simply feeling accepted in the community.
Either the lender or a borrower can monitor. The borrower who is being
monitored observes c. Since the punishment yields a benefit to the monitor, she
has an incentive to carry it out.
I assume that the lender cannot observe whether the borrowers are monitoring
each other or not. This assumption is important, since if the lender could observe
whether borrowers monitor, he would not need to use joint liability to induce
17The way of modeling monitoring is based loosely on Banerjee et al [7].
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borrowers to monitor.18
2.4. The players’ objectives
I consider the contracting problem between one lender and two borrowers, however
I assume that they function in a competitive credit market with many lenders.
I assume that all lenders know which loan applicant borrowed how much from
whom and on what terms, therefore I can analyze the contract between one
lender and two borrowers in isolation from other contracts. Since the market is
competitive, a profit-maximizing lender will oﬀer a contract which maximizes a
borrower’s utility subject to the constraint that the lender break even.
I assume that the distribution functions of returns to projects are independent.
Then the lender’s profit is
Π = pipjSuu+pi(1−pj)Suf+pj(1−pi)Sfu+(1−pi)(1−pj)Sff−ρL−W (cl) i, j = s, r
where borrower 1 chooses project i and borrower 2 chooses project j. Sk, k =
uu, uf, fu, ff , are payments which are contingent on the outcomes observable to
the lender without monitoring. Suu is the amount which borrower 1 has to repay
when both borrowers’ projects succeed. Suf is the amount which borrower 1 pays
when her project succeeds and 2’s project fails. Sfu is the amount which 1 pays
when 1’s project fails and 2’s project succeeds. Sff is the amount when both
projects fail. cl is the amount of monitoring which the lender plans to undertake.
I noted in the introduction that borrowers in most areas only have access to
one microcredit lender. This observation suggests that the lender has monopoly
power. However, that is not quite right. Microcredit lenders face competition
from other sources of credit, such as moneylenders, informal or formal commu-
nity networks and occasionally commercial banks.19 The competition is far from
perfect, since some of these other sources have much smaller supplies of credit
than microcredit lenders do, and others are more reluctant to lend to the poor,
lending only to a selected subset of microcredit clients. However, there is compe-
tition.
An alternative perspective on the lender’s objective consistent with the model
is that the lender maximizes social surplus subject to the constraint that he be
able to break-even. This is reasonable for microcredit lenders, since their objective
is to raise the welfare of the borrowers.
18While giving the borrowers an incentive to monitor each other may not be the only reason
why we observe joint-liability contracts, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is an important
reason. Otero and Rhyne [35]
19For example, one of the more careful studies of moneyenders finds little evidence for the
existence of monopoly rents. Aleem [3]
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Borrowers maximize their utility. The expected utility function of borrower 1
when she implements project i and 2 implements project j, i, j = s, r is
Vij(S
k, L) = pipjU(Ri(L) + w − Suu) + pi(1− pj)U(Ri(L) +w − Suf ) +
(1− pi)pjU(w − Sfu) + (1− pi)(1− pj)U(w − Sff )
i, j = s, r
Similarly, Vji(Sk, L) would be the expected utility of borrower 2.
2.5. The game
The timing is the following. The lender oﬀers a contract, {L, Sk, cl}, k = uu, uf, fu, ff .
The borrowers decide whether or not to accept. If they accept, the lender begins
to monitor. Then borrowers choose their levels of monitoring and projects. I
will describe the game which determines their choices below. Finally, returns are
realized and payments are made. Figure 2 shows the time line.
If each borrower’s payments, Sk, do not depend on the outcome of the other
borrower’s project, i.e. Suu = Suf = Su and Sfu = Sff = Sf , then the contract
is an individual-liability one. In this case, borrowers do not monitor and each
chooses a project to maximize her expected utility, independently of the other’s
choice. Each borrower chooses the safe project if
Vs(S
k, L) ≥ Vr(Sk, L)− cl (1)
where Vi(Sk, L) = piU(Ri(L) +w − Su) + (1− pi)U(w − Sf ) for i = s, r.
If a borrower’s payments depend on the outcome of the other borrower’s
project then the contract is a joint-liability one. If Suu 9= Suf , then Suf > Suu,
i.e. each borrower helps to repay the other’s debt if her project succeeds and
the other’s fails.20 I refer to the payment Suf as the joint liability. In this case
borrowers play the following non-cooperative game. I summarize the results here.
I explain the details in section 7.1 of the appendix.
Knowing the terms of the contract, both borrowers simultaneously choose
levels of expected punishment cmg , m = 1, 2. m denotes the borrower and g stands
for a group. Borrowers observe each other’s choices, but the lender does not.
Then they simultaneously choose projects. I assume that borrowers implement
the strategies, i.e. level of monitoring and choice of project, which constitute a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of this game.
The game has three possible SPNEs. Both borrowers monitor and choose
the safe project, neither monitors and both choose the risky project or both
20 I prove this statement in section 3.3.
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monitor and choose the risky project. By backward induction, consider the sub-
game in which borrowers choose projects after both choose not to monitor. Only
symmetric strategies constitute a NE, because borrowers’ actions are strategic
complements. If one borrower chooses the risky project, the probability that she
will have to pay the liability declines from ps(1−ps) to pr(1−ps), while the prob-
ability that the other borrower will have to pay the liability rises from ps(1− ps)
to ps(1 − pr). Then the other borrower obtains the same gain as the first from
choosing the risky project, plus a larger decrease from ps(1− pr) to pr(1− pr) in
the probability that she will have to pay the liability. Thus, if one chooses the
risky project, the other one will as well. In this subgame, this is the only NE.
Both borrowers choosing the risky project is also the only NE in each of the
subgames after asymmetric monitoring decisions. A borrower who monitors will
choose cg such that the other borrower prefers to choose the safe project if the
monitor chooses the safe project, i.e. cg satisfies
Vss(S
k, L) ≥ Vrs(Sk, L)− cg (2)
I show in section 7.1 of the appendix that this is the least costly level of monitoring
which ensures that the partner chooses the safe project. This level of monitoring
is not suﬃcient to induce a borrower to choose the safe project if her partner
chooses the risky project.21 Anyone who is not being monitored will choose the
risky project and then so will her partner.
A NE in which both borrowers choose the safe project exists only in the sub-
game after both borrowers choose to monitor. It is a NE in this subgame, because
a borrower who monitors chooses cg to satisfy (2). Both borrowers choosing the
risky project is also a NE in this subgame under some conditions.
Consider the game as a whole. The decisions whether or not to monitor are
also symmetric. The SPNE in which both borrowers monitor and both choose




g , Lg)−W (cg) ≥ Vrr(Skg , Lg) (3)
If the expected benefit from punishing the other borrower for choosing the risky
project is not too large, then the two other SPNEs noted above exist. However,
the SPNE in which both borrowers monitor and both choose the safe project is
the Pareto dominant (or strong) one.23 I assume that the borrowers play this
latter equilibrium.
21See section 7.1 for details.
22The constraint can be interpreted as a no-collusion constraint.
23Since borrowers can collude, the strong equilibrium may be the relevant concept. This
equilibrium is unique. I discuss this further in section 1 of the appendix.
12
In summary, if the contract is an individual-liability one, borrowers do not
monitor each other and each chooses a project according to condition (1). If
the contract is a joint-liability one, borrowers monitor each other with intensity
defined by (2) and both choose the safe project if condition (3) is satisfied.
3. The terms of the individual and joint-liability loan contracts
The lender’s decision can be analyzed in two steps. He can determine first what
should be the terms of the contract conditional on the assignment of monitoring
responsibility, i.e. conditional on whether liability is individual or joint. In the
second step, he determines which contract he should oﬀer in order to maximize
welfare. In sections 4.2 and 4.3, I carry out the first step.
3.1. The first-best
If the choice of project were observable, the lender would oﬀer a loan which
maximizes the return to the safe project, L = L, and payments which oﬀer the
borrowers full insurance while enabling the lender to break even, for example
Suu = Suf = (1− ps)Rs(L) + ρL and Sfu = Sff = −(psRs(L)− ρL). He would
confiscate returns if the borrower chose the risky project.
The first best would also be attainable if the choice of project were not ob-
servable but monitoring were costless. The lender would simply have to monitor
suﬃciently that the borrower would choose the safe project even given full insur-
ance.
In general, first best cannot be achieved if the choice of project is not ob-
servable and monitoring is costly. If payments are such that borrowers are fully
insured, the borrowers will not monitor each other and the cost of monitoring
required of the lender may be too high.
3.2. The lender-monitored and the unmonitored individual-liability loan
contract
Since the credit market is competitive, the lender oﬀers a contract which maxi-
mizes the utility of the borrower subject to the constraints that the lender break
even and the borrower choose the safe project, as discussed in section 2.4.
In an individual-liability contract, the lender oﬀers contract terms {Ll, Skl , cl},












l , Ll) ≥ Vr(Skl , Ll)− cl
psS
u
l + (1− ps)S
f
l − ρLl −W (cl) ≥ 0
Sul ≤ Rs(Ll) + w S
f
l ≤ w
The first constraint is the incentive constraint, equation (1) in section 2.5.24 The
second is the lender’s break-even constraint. The third is the set of limited liability
constraints.
In general, the solution to the problem depends on the degree of risk aversion,
however the following lemma presents a case in which it does not. In the remainder
of the paper I focus on this case.
Lemma 3.1. Under assumptions A.1 - A.5, there exists pls such that for ps > p
l
s,
the solution to problem (4) specifies Sfl = w and
Sul =
ρLl − (1− ps)w +W (cl)
ps
Proof. The proof is in section 7.3 of the appendix.
The lemma states that when the probability of success of the safe project is
large enough, the borrower gives up all of her wealth when the project fails. The
larger is the payment in case of failure, the less incentive the borrower has to
choose the risky project, therefore the less costly is monitoring for a given size
loan. Lowering the cost of monitoring increases welfare for two reasons. The
first eﬀect is direct. Second, an increase in the cost of monitoring increases the
payment which the borrower has to make if the project succeeds. It is a tax on
success, which makes the risky project more attractive and therefore reduces the
loan size which the lender can oﬀer.
On the other hand, the maximum possible collateral imposes risk. However,
the bigger is the probability of success of the safe project, the less likely is failure
to occur in equilibrium. Thus, if the probability of success is large enough, the
maximum collateral is optimal regardless of the degree of risk aversion.25
Considering a large enough probability of success is one way of imposing
the condition that the borrower faces credit rationing.26 The lender can always
24 I discuss the choice of the level of monitoring, cl, in section 7.2 of the appendix.
25The contract in the lemma is optimal if borrowers are risk-neutral regardless of the proba-
bility of success of the safe project.
26 Interestingly, almost every study of microenterprises notes that businesses undertaken by
low-income entrepreneurs have very high success rates. The evidence is anecdotal. One indirect
indicator of rates of success are repayment rates, which are 92% to 98% in well-managed pro-
grams, both individual-liability and joint-liability ones. See for example Christen et. al. [14],
Hossain [23], Mann et. al. [33], Otero and Rhyne [35].
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increase the loan size and the collateral while holding the interest rate fixed, as
long as the borrower has more collateral available. If such an increase lowers
utility, one could argue that the borrower is not facing credit rationing, because
she does not demand a larger loan at the equilibrium interest rate.
The contract in which the lender does not monitor is simply the special case
in which cl = 0. The contract is then analogous to what would be a debt contract
in a model with a richer state space.
3.3. The joint-liability loan contract
The lender oﬀers a contract, consisting of the following terms, cl = 0 and {Lg, Skg },






g , Lg)−W (cg) k = uu, uf, fu, ff (5)
s.t. Vss(S
k
g , Lg)−W (cg) ≥ Vrr(Skg , Lg)
cg ≥ Vrs(Skg , Lg)− Vss(Skg , Lg)
p2sS
uu
g + ps(1− ps)Sufg + ps(1− ps)Sfug + (1− ps)2Sffg − ρLg ≥ 0
Suug ≤ Rs(Lg) + w Sufg ≤ Rs(Lg) +w Sfug ≤ w Sffg ≤ w
The first two constraints are the incentive constraints (3) and (2) discussed in
section 2.5, the third is the lender’s break-even constraint and the fourth is the
set of limited liability constraints.
As in the case of the individual-liability contract, in general the solution de-
pends on the degree of risk aversion. The following lemma characterizes a solution
which does not.
Lemma 3.2. Under assumptions A.1 - A.5, there exists pgs such that for ps > pgs,
the solution to problem (5) specifies Sfug = S
ff
g = w, S
uf
g = Rs(Lg) + w, and
Suug =
ρLg − (1− p2s)w − ps(1− ps)Rs(Lg)
p2s
Proof. The proof is in section 7.3 of the appendix.
The contract takes away all of the borrower’s wealth if the borrower’s own
project fails and the return to the safe project plus the wealth if her partner’s
27 I do not consider the possibility that the lender may also monitor in the joint-liability
contract.
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project fails but her own succeeds, i.e. in equilibrium her payoﬀ is zero unless both
projects succeed. The borrower pays the maximum possible when her own project
fails for the same reason as in the case of individual liability. The maximum joint
liability has two advantages. First, it lowers the payment in the state in which
both projects succeed as much as possible, thereby rewarding the choice of the
safe project by both borrowers. This eﬀect minimizes the cost of monitoring
necessary for any given loan size. Second, the larger is the liability the larger
is the maximum loan size at which the borrowers will still monitor each other,
rather than switching to the equilibrium in which they do not monitor and choose
the risky project.
The contract is optimal if the probability of success of the safe project is
large enough.28 However, this probability needs to be larger for the maximum
joint liability and maximum collateral to be optimal than it does for maximum
collateral alone to be optimal, holding all else constant. The subsequent results
do not require that maximum joint liability be optimal. I will use this contract to
simplify the presentation, however all conclusions are valid for the case in which
the joint liability is some fraction of the wealth available to the borrower when
her project succeeds, Sufg ≤ Rs(Lg) + w, as long as Sufg  Suug .29
4. The optimal contract as a function of wealth
In this section, I compare welfare under a joint-liability contract to welfare under
an individual-liability contract. The theme of the results is that the optimal
contract depends on the wealth which a borrower can oﬀer as collateral.
4.1. A comparison between joint-liability and individual-liability when
the lender cannot monitor
I first consider whether borrowers ever prefer an individual contract with no mon-
itoring to a joint-liability contract. I am considering here an individual contract
in which the lender cannot monitor, i.e. the lender does not choose cl optimally.
This is a comparison most favorable to joint liability, since one would expect that
monitoring reduces the attractiveness of the risky project and allows the lender
to oﬀer a larger loan. The unmonitored, individual contract is not necessarily of
28The contract is optimal if borrowers are risk-neutral regardless of the probability of success
of the safe project.
29The results do require that the diﬀerence between Sufg and S
uu
g be more than an incremental
one. Otherwise, the risk which the liability imposes has only a second order eﬀect, because a
utility function is approximately linear around a point. The results depend on the fact that joint
liability imposes risk which has a first-order eﬀect.
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interest in itself. However, if borrowers prefer it to the joint-liability contract,
they will also prefer the individual contract when the lender chooses the level of
monitoring optimally.
I assume that the cost of monitoring is composed of a fixed cost and a marginal
cost. The fixed cost may be the cost of screening potential partners, forming the
group and agreeing upon the rules which the group should follow. Let FC denote
this fixed cost. ThenW (c) = FC+w(c), where w(c) is the part of the monitoring
cost which increases with the intensity of monitoring. Let a be the coeﬃcient of
absolute risk aversion. V ∗n and V
∗
g are the borrower’s utilities in equilibrium
when the loan is an unmonitored one and a group one, respectively, and ρ is the
opportunity cost of capital.
The proposition states that, if at some level of a borrower’s wealth her cost
of monitoring is such that she is indiﬀerent between the joint-liability and the
unmonitored, individual contract, then a marginally wealthier borrower prefers
the individual contract if the stated conditions hold. I state the result in terms of
an increase in one borrower’s wealth from a point at which both borrowers have
the same wealth levels.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that for some level of wealth, ew, V ∗n = V ∗g . Assume
that Rs(L) = R

r (L) = 0. There exists a ps such that for all ps > ps there exists






Proof. The proof is in section 7.4 of the appendix.30
Both welfare and loan size increase more in the individual contract than in
the group contract when a borrower’s wealth increases. A borrower may prefer
the unmonitored, individual contract even when the joint-liability loan is larger,
because the utility lost due to the risk which joint liability imposes and the cost
of monitoring may be larger than utility gained from the larger loan. I outline
the proof in footnote 32.31 This outline oﬀers a full explanation of why welfare
30The proof of the proposition is based on the extreme group contract which sets the group
liability at its maximum. The proof for the case in which Suf < Rs(Lg) + w is available from
the author.
31An increase in wealth above the level at which borrowers are indiﬀerent between the individ-
ual and the group contract has two eﬀects. It increases welfare directly. It also has an indirect
eﬀect, relaxing the incentive constraint and allowing an increase in loan size.
The direct eﬀect of an increase in wealth is larger in the individual contract because of declining
marginal utility of wealth. In order for borrowers to be indiﬀerent between the contracts, the
payoﬀ in case of success must be larger in the group contract, since it occurs with a smaller
probability. Therefore an equal increase in wealth raises utility less in the group contract.
The indirect eﬀect is also larger in the individual contract. An increase in wealth relaxes the
group incentive constraint less than the individual one. This is because the eﬀect of an increase
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increases more in the individual contract. In the text below, I oﬀer an intuitive
discussion of why the individual loan may increase more than a join-liability loan
when wealth increases.
The joint liability has two incentive eﬀects. One makes the risky project
less attractive, allowing the lender to oﬀer a larger loan. The second works in
the opposite direction. Under the assumptions in the proposition, the adverse
incentive eﬀect begins to dominate above some level of wealth.
The positive incentive eﬀect of joint liability induces borrowers to monitor
each other. I describe this eﬀect in more detail in section 2.5 and in section
7.1 of the appendix. In the absence of monitoring, borrowers’ project choices are
strategic complements. If one borrower chooses the risky project, her partner does
as well, raising the probability that the borrower will have to pay the liability. As
a result, borrowers in a group may monitor and choose the safe project even when
the loan size is such that an individual borrower, not linked by joint liability, would
choose the risky project. Therefore, the lender may be able to oﬀer a larger loan
to members of a group than he could to borrowers who have individual contracts.
This eﬀect becomes stronger as the size of the liability grows with a borrower’s
wealth. It is the only eﬀect which liability has on incentives if borrowers are
risk-neutral. Therefore, if borrowers are risk-neutral, the joint-liability contract
dominates the individual, unmonitored contract at all levels of wealth.32
If borrowers are risk-averse, joint liability also has an adverse incentive eﬀect.
Joint liability imposes a risk on borrowers which is absent in the individual con-
tract. If a project fails, the individual contract and the group contract yield the
same payoﬀ, zero, since the borrower gives up all of her wealth. If the project
succeeds, an individual contract oﬀers a sure payoﬀ, while the group contract
oﬀers a lottery. The payoﬀ in the lottery depends on the outcome of the part-
ner’s project. Table 1 summarizes the payoﬀs in the two contracts. A borrower
guarantees herself a larger income in the low-payoﬀ state of this lottery (the state
in which she has to pay the liability) when she chooses the risky project simply
in wealth on utility obtained from choosing the safe project is smaller in the group contract (this
is the direct eﬀect of wealth). When borrowers are suﬃciently risk-averse, one can eﬀectively
ignore the eﬀect of wealth on the utility obtained from choosing the risky project. This will
be small, because the return to the risky project is larger than the return to the safe project,
conditional on success. Figure 3 illustrates this argument.
Finally, an equal increase in loan size tightens the group incentive constraint more than it
tightens the individual incentive constraint. The reason is the risk which joint liability imposes,
which I discuss in the text below. The risky project mitigates this risk and increasingly so as
the loan size grows. Therefore an increase in loan size raises the utility from the risky project
more relative to utility from the safe project in the joint-liability contract than in the individual
one. Thus, loan size can increase more in the individual contract than in the group one.
32A proof of this statement is available from the author.
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because the risky project yields a larger return when it succeeds, and this larger
return is unobservable to the lender. This eﬀect makes the risky project more at-
tractive to borrowers in a group, if they are risk-averse, since the project reduces
the risk imposed on them by the liability.
The adverse incentive eﬀect grows with wealth, because a wealthier borrower
obtains a larger loan and assumption A.4 implies that the diﬀerence between the
return to the risky and the safe project grows with loan size. If borrowers are
suﬃciently risk-averse, i.e. they care enough about the low payoﬀ, above some
level of wealth the risky project may be more attractive to members of a group
than to an individual borrower. Therefore, the lender can oﬀer a larger loan to
an individual borrower than he can to a member of a group.
Proposition 4.1 oﬀers a reason why credit-constrained borrowers may prefer
an individual-liability contract to a joint-liability one. The striking aspect of the
result is that it holds even in the case most favorable to joint liability, when the
lender cannot monitor. The result is true under some conditions, the availability
of very safe projects, the availability of risky projects which are more productive
than safe projects if they succeed, high degree of risk aversion of borrowers and
large opportunity cost of funds. These conditions seem to accurately character-
ize circumstances faced by lenders who serve small business owners. I discuss
evidence which suggests that the result is empirically important in section 5.
4.2. A comparison between joint-liability and individual liability when
the lender can monitor
Proposition 4.1 implies that the wealthier among credit-constrained borrowers
prefer an individual, lender-monitored contract to a joint-liability contract. There-
fore, if any borrowers prefer the joint-liability contract, they are the poorer ones.
The remaining question is whether there is ever any reason to delegate monitoring
to the borrowers. I first compare the costs of monitoring and then welfare more
generally.
4.2.1. The costs of monitoring
In this section, I show that monitoring by the borrowers is more eﬃcient than is
monitoring by the lender even when the lender and the borrowers have access to
the same monitoring technology. Therefore, joint-liability loans are cheaper.
Let W (c) = FC +w(c), as in section 4.1, and let L∗n be the optimal loan size
in the unmonitored contract.
Proposition 4.2. Fix Ll = Lg = L > L∗n. For such L there exists FC such that
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for FC > FC, cl > cg.
Proof. Fix Ll = L > L∗n. Consider the lowest cl which induces a borrower to










Assume cl exists which solves this expression.33
Consider the lowest cg which induces a borrower to choose the safe project in






ρL− w − ps(1− ps)Rs(L)
p2s
) + pr(1− ps)Uufr (Rr(L)−Rs(L)) (2)
−p2sUuus (Rs(L)−
ρL− w − ps(1− ps)Rs(L)
p2s
)
In order to compare the two expressions, first suppose that borrowers are
risk-neutral. Then the expression for cl is
cl = (ps − pr)
ρL+W (cl)− w
ps
− (prRr(L)− psRs(L)) (3)
and the expression for cg is
cg = (ps − pr)
ρL− w
ps
− (prRr(L)− psRs(L)) (4)
The expression for cg is the diﬀerence between utilities generated by the risky and
the safe project respectively for a borrower who obtains an individual-liability loan
of size L. Since, by assumption, L > L∗n, cg > 0. Then cl > 0 and W (cl) > 0.
Therefore, cl > cg.
Now consider risk-averse borrowers. Suppressing the arguments of the utility
functions, the diﬀerence between cl and cg can be written as
cl − cg = [prUur − psUus ]− [pr(psUuur + (1− ps)Uufr )− ps(psUuus )] (5)
Ignore the term ps−prps W (cl) in expression (3). Then the only diﬀerence between
(cl − cg) in the risk-neutral and the risk-averse case is the risk introduced by
the group liability. The low payoﬀ when the project succeeds and the borrower
has chosen the risky project is larger than is the low payoﬀ when the borrower
33 I analyze existence in section 7.2 of the appendix.
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has chosen the safe project, therefore the introduction of risk aversion may lower
the payoﬀ to the safe project more than the payoﬀ to the risky project causing
cg to exceed cl. However, the term
ps−pr
ps
W (cl) tends to raise cl relative to cg.
There exists some FC such that for FC > FC, the latter eﬀect dominates and
cl > cg.
The result states that a borrower needs to impose a smaller expected punish-
ment in order for her partner to choose the safe project than would have to be
imposed by the lender for a given loan size and amount of collateral. In other
words, borrowers need to incur a smaller cost of monitoring to achieve the same
result.34
In the individual contract, the cost of monitoring distorts the incentive to
choose the safe project. Borrowers do not have suﬃcient wealth to repay the loan
fully unless the project succeeds. In order to break even on an individual loan,
the lender has to raise the payment in the state in which the project succeeds
relative to the payment which would allow him to break even on a joint-liability
loan of the same size, since he is incurring the cost of monitoring in the individual
contract but not in the group one. If he wants to extract more surplus, he needs to
increase this payment even further. The higher payment in case of success renders
the risky project, with a smaller probability of success, more attractive, raising
the cost of monitoring needed to induce the borrowers to choose the safe project.
When they monitor themselves, the borrowers use their labor, an endowment
which is not subject to limited liability. Then, the cost of monitoring is not part
of the costs of the loan which have to be repaid out of limited wealth. Therefore
it does not distort the incentive to choose the safe project.
The importance of the result is that it provides a reason for delegating mon-
itoring in the case which most favors the lender-monitored contract, when bor-
rowers do not have access to a more eﬃcient monitoring technology. Monitoring
technologies of lenders and borrowers may diﬀer in reality. However, both lenders
and borrowers monitor, often quite extensively, and there is little, if any, system-
atic evidence about diﬀerences in technologies.
4.2.2. Welfare
Even poorer borrowers could prefer a lender-monitored contract if the latter oﬀers
a loan which is suﬃciently larger to compensate for the diﬀerence in the costs of
34The high rates of interest charged by moneylenders provide some empirical support for this
result. Moneylenders often monitor the borrowers, and they typically charge exorbitantly high
interest rates, 150% per year and higher. The rates may reflect market power, but Aleem [3]
provides empirical evidence which suggests that they are due to high costs of monitoring.
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monitoring. The comparison between loan sizes is ambiguous. I assume that the
lender cannot observe whether the borrowers monitor each other or not. This
assumption is necessary for joint liability to ever be used. Otherwise, the lender
could simply confiscate an amount equivalent to the returns to the safe project
if the project succeeds and the borrowers did not monitor. Therefore, a lender
who monitors may be able to oﬀer a loan size which would cause borrowers in a
group to choose not to monitor and implement the risky project.
Borrowers could also prefer the lender-monitored contract if the lender’s cost
of monitoring a given size loan is less than the combined cost of monitoring by
the borrowers and the risk imposed by the liability.
5. Empirical implications
In a world in which lenders oﬀer a menu of contracts, the theory implies that
the wealthier among poor borrowers choose individual loans, lender-monitored or
unmonitored. The poorer borrowers may choose joint-liability loans. However,
most poor household do not have a choice of contracts. Typically, a given lender
oﬀers only one type of contract and many poor households only have access to one
lender. I present evidence about the sizes of group and individual loans oﬀered by
microcredit lenders and government and commercial banks in Bangladesh. The
context illustrates the types of restrictions faced by low-income borrowers. The
data comes from households who live in rural areas and who own less than 5
acres of land. All microcredit lenders in the data oﬀer only group loans.35 Banks
oﬀer only individual loans. Access is subject to institutional restrictions. All
the microcredit organizations target households which own less than one-half of
an acre of land. However, they do not enforce this rule strictly, so wealthier
households may be able to obtain a group loan but are less likely to be able to
do so. Furthermore, microcredit lenders do not lend to inhabitants of villages in
which they do not have an oﬃce. Access to bank loans is limited mostly by one’s
social connections. Therefore, among households with the same level of wealth,
some will obtain group loans and some will obtain individual loans, depending
on access.
If access to contracts is restricted, the theory implies that poorer borrow-
ers who obtain joint-liability loans will have larger loans than those who obtain
individual loans, while the reverse will be true for the wealthier among the credit-
constrained borrowers. In order to see this more clearly, imagine that loan con-
tracts are assigned to borrowers randomly. Therefore, a borrower who has a given
amount of wealth is equally likely to be assigned a group or an individual loan.
35One of the NGOs is the flagship of microcredit programs, the Grameen Bank.
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According to the theory, which loan is larger depends on the borrower’s wealth.
While contracts are not assigned randomly in reality, the important point is that
the contract which a borrower obtains depends at least partly on institutional
rules and not only on the borrower’s preferences.
The data, presented in Table 1, show that group loans are larger than individ-
ual loans for households which own less than 0.04 acres of land.36 For wealthier
households, individual loans are larger. 0.04 acres is a tiny amount and far less
than the amount above which a household ceases to be eligible for a group loan.
The evidence is merely descriptive. In Madajewicz [31], I carry out a more care-
ful econometric analysis. In that analysis, the level of wealth at which individual
loans become larger depends on the methodology. One approach yields the same
result as the descriptive table. Another implies that the wealth level is 1.8 acres.
Even if the higher wealth level is the correct one, borrowers who own 1.8 acres
are still very poor. They are considerably poorer than the wealthiest microcre-
dit client, who owns 14 acres, and their access to formal sources of credit is no
diﬀerent than is that of borrowers who own 0.04 acres.
If group loans are larger than individual loans for only the poorest among
the borrowers, as the data suggest, then microcredit lenders like the ones in
Bangladesh are having less impact on poverty than they would have if they oﬀered
individual loans to their wealthier borrowers. The exclusive reliance on group
loans is a widespread phenomenon, not particular to Bangladesh. The lenders
may be unnecessarily limiting their borrowers’ access to capital.
6. Conclusion
The paper makes two main points. First, joint liability in credit contracts has a
negative incentive eﬀect, which may cause a group of borrowers linked by joint
liability to choose riskier investments than would be chosen by individual borrow-
ers. Consequently, a joint-liability loan may be smaller than an individual loan
oﬀered by a lender who does not monitor, since the smaller loan size reduces the
incentive to choose the risky project. This negative incentive eﬀect is likely to
dominate the positive incentive eﬀect of joint liability for the wealthier borrowers,
i.e. those who can oﬀer relatively more collateral. The important point is that
even these wealthier borrowers are credit-constrained, however peer monitoring
does not help to relax that constraint.
Data from Bangladesh provide evidence of the empirical importance of this
eﬀect. The data show that individual-liability loans are smaller than joint-liability
36Diﬀerences between average loan sizes in the two contracts are significant at a level of 1%
for both the poorer and the wealthier groups.
23
loans only at extremely low levels of wealth.
The disincentive eﬀect of joint-liability has a simple and potentially important
policy implication. The great majority of microcredit lenders use only joint-
liability loans. The policy may reduce loan sizes and therefore the poor borrowers’
ability to invest.37 The poor may be better oﬀ if the lenders oﬀer a choice of
contracts.
The second point in the paper is that monitoring by the borrowers is more
eﬃcient than is monitoring by the lender, even when the borrowers and the lender
have the same costs of monitoring per unit of eﬀort. The result provides a reason
for oﬀering group loans rather than individual loans to poorer borrowers. The
eﬃciency of peer monitoring is not suﬃcient for poorer borrowers to prefer group
loans, since a lender who monitors may be able to oﬀer a larger loan.
The model in this paper only considers the eﬀect of the loan contract on loan
size. Empirical analysis in Madajewicz [32] suggests that the loan contract also
aﬀects the type of investment undertaken by the borrowers.
The eﬀects of wealth predicted here may appear in contexts other than lend-
ing, for example in the choice between a partnership and an individual form of
ownership of a firm. The diﬀerence between the eﬃciency of monitoring by one’s
peers and by an outsider when there is limited liability may also apply to the
analysis of firms managed as partnerships. The development of these applica-
tions remains for future work.
37The policy may give rise to a poverty trap. The point is analogous to Banerjee and Newman’s
[8] remark that the use of collateral in response to information problems causes a poverty trap
since poor people cannot borrow to invest because they are poor.
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Table 1a: Payoﬀs to borrower 1 by contract type:
borrowers linked by joint liability monitor and choose the safe project
(ignoring costs of monitoring)
State of the world Payoﬀs to borrower 1 by contract type
Joint liability Individual liability
both projects succeed Rs(Lg)− Suug +w Ri(Ln)− Sun +w
own project succeeds, partner’s project fails 0 Ri(Ln)− Sun +w
own project fails, partner’s project succeeds 0 0
both projects fail 0 0
In the individual-liability contract, only the project returns depend on the
choice of project. i = s, r
Table 1b: Payoﬀs to borrower 1 by contract type:
borrowers linked by joint liability do not monitor and choose the
risky project
State of the world Payoﬀs to borrower 1 by contract type
Joint liability Individual liability
both projects succeed Rr(Lg)− Suug + w Ri(Ln)− Sun + w
own project succeeds, partner’s project fails Rr(Lg)−Rs(Lg) Ri(Ln)− Sun + w
own project fails, partner’s project succeeds 0 0
both projects fail 0 0
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Table 2: Mean loan sizes by borrowers’ wealth and type of contract
Borrowers’ wealth Type of contract
Joint-liability Individual-liability
Amount of land ≤0.04 acres 3310 taka 2266 taka
SE = 232.87 # of obs. = 465 SE = 281.81 # of obs. = 5
Amount of land >0.04 acres 3564 taka 4925 taka
SE = 158.60 # of obs. = 1571 SE = 523.75 # of obs. = 75
SE is the standard error of the mean estimate. Obs is the number of obser-
vations in the cell.
The exchange rate for the relevant years was 33 taka/US$1.
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7. Appendix
7.1. The game in which borrowers choose the level of monitoring and
projects
Given the terms of the contract, which are loan size L, payments Sk, and the
certainty equivalent of the expected punishment announced by the lender, cl,
the borrowers play the following game. Each borrower’s strategy set consists of
{cmg , Pm} m = 1, 2, where m denotes the borrower who imposes the punishment,
cmg denotes the CE of expected punishment which the borrower announces and
Pm = s, r is the project, safe or risky. Borrowers simultaneously choose cmg . They
observe the other’s choice. Then they simultaneously choose the projects. I look
for subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of this game.
I suppose that if a borrower chooses cmg > 0, she chooses c
m
g which ensures




g , Lg)− Vss(Skg , Lg) (A.1)
where the first subscript on V denotes the project chosen by the borrower’s part-
ner and the second denotes the project chosen by the borrower herself. I solve
the game using this level of cmg , then I show that this is indeed the level chosen
in equilibrium. I assume that the punishment is costless to impose. Since the
punishment is confiscation of the borrower’s returns, the monitor has an incentive
to carry it out even if it were costly.
I summarize the payoﬀs to borrower one from all possible strategies in Table
A.1. Two’s payoﬀs are symmetric. Punishing yields the CE of the punishment,
cmg , to the borrower who imposes it.
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1, P 2) Payoﬀs to borrower 1
c1g > 0, c
2
g > 0, s, s Vss(S
k
g , Lg)−W (c1g)
c1g > 0, c
2
g > 0, s, r Vsr(S
k
g , Lg)−W (c1g) + c1g
c1g > 0, c
2
g > 0, r, s Vrs(S
k
g , Lg)−W (c1g)− c2g
c1g > 0, c
2
g > 0, r, r Vrr(S
k
g , Lg)−W (c1g)
c1g > 0, c
2
g = 0, s, s Vss(S
k
g , Lg)−W (c1g)
c1g > 0, c
2
g = 0, s, r Vsr(S
k
g , Lg)−W (c1g) + c1g
c1g > 0, c
2
g = 0, r, s Vrs(S
k
g , Lg)−W (c1g)
c1g > 0, c
2
g = 0, r, r Vrr(S
k
g , Lg)−W (c1g) + c1g
c1g = 0, c
2
g > 0, s, s Vss(S
k
g , Lg)
c1g = 0, c
2
g > 0, s, r Vsr(S
k
g , Lg)
c1g = 0, c
2
g > 0, r, s Vrs(S
k
g , Lg)− c2g
c1g = 0, c
2
g > 0, r, r Vrr(S
k
g , Lg)− c2g
c1g = 0, c
2
g = 0, s, s Vss(S
k
g , Lg)
c1g = 0, c
2
g = 0, s, r Vsr(S
k
g , Lg)
c1g = 0, c
2
g = 0, r, s Vrs(S
k
g , Lg)
c1g = 0, c
2
g = 0, r, r Vrr(S
k
g , Lg)
The punishment and benefit of punishing do not appear in the payoﬀ in line 4,





I solve the game by backward induction. Consider the subgame following the
decision by both borrowers to monitor. If borrower one (two) chooses the safe
project, two (one) chooses the safe project by constraint (A.1). Therefore (s1, s2)
is a Nash equilibrium. If one (two) chooses the risky project, two (one) also
chooses the risky project as long as cg is small enough so that
Vsr(S
k
g , Lg) + cg < Vrr(S
k
g , Lg) (A.2)
The reason is that cmg defined by (A.1) is not suﬃcient to induce a borrower
to choose the safe project if her partner chooses the risky project. Denote this





r + pr(1− pr)Uufr − psprUuus (A.3)




r + pr(1− ps)Uufr − p2sUuus (A.4)
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The diﬀerence between the two is







r . The argument of U
uf
r , is at least as large as the
diﬀerence between the arguments of Uuur and U
uu
s , and it equals this diﬀerence,
Rr(L) − Rs(L), when the group contract imposes the maximum group liability.
Then, given the concavity of U , the expression is negative, and cgr > cgs. There-
fore, (r1, r2) is also a Nash equilibrium if condition A.2 holds. As long as the
terms of the contract satisfy the group incentive constraint,
Vss(S
k
g , Lg)−W (cg) ≥ Vrr(Skg , Lg) (A.6)
(s1, s2) is the Pareto dominant (or strong) equilibrium.
(r1, r2) is the unique Nash equilibrium in each of the other three proper sub-
games.
The game as a whole has three possible SPNEs, (c1g > 0, c
2
g > 0, s
1, s2), (c1g =
0, c2g = 0, r
1, r2), (c1g > 0, c
2
g > 0, r
1, r2). If contract terms satisfy A.6, then
(c1g > 0, c
2
g > 0, s
1, s2) is the Pareto dominant (or strong) equilibrium.
The level of cg determined by A.1 is the lowest level which supports the
equilibrium in which both borrowers monitor and choose the safe project. A
lower level would result in both choosing the risky project, since if one chooses
the risky project the other does as well. Any higher level is unnecessarily costly.
7.2. The solution to the lender’s monitoring problem




r (Rr(Ll)− Sul + w)− psUus (Rs(Ll)− Sul + w)
where Sul is a function ofW (cl). A cl which solves this expression may not always
exist. Consider Ll such that a borrower would choose the risky project in the
absence of monitoring. For such an Ll the right-hand side of the constraint is
strictly positive at cl = 0. W (cl) is convex and U(·) is concave. A solution exists
if the right-hand-side is concave in cl, see figure A.1. If the right-hand-side is
convex in cl, a solution may not exist, figure A.2, or there may be two solutions,
figure A.3. I assume the former case does not occur for L < L. In the latter case,
the lender will implement the lower cl.
7.3. The terms of the contracts
I prove lemmas 3.1 and 3.2.
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Let β denote the portion of w which the contract requires the borrower to
pay when both projects fail, Sff = βw, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Let γ be the fraction when
borrower one’s project fails but two’s succeeds, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. In the same state, let
δ be the portion of borrower two’s income, (Rs(Lg) + w), paid to borrower one,
Sfu = γw−δ(Rs(Lg)+w). Let α be the fraction of income borrower one pays when
her project succeeds and two’s fails, Suf = α(Rs(Lg)+w), 0 ≤ (α+δ) ≤ 1.38 The
payment when both succeed is determined by the lender’s break-even constraint.
In lemma 7.1, I determine the optimal payments in a lender-monitored and




I rewrite lemma 3.1. The subscript l denotes the lender-monitored contract.
Lemma 7.1. Assume that βl = γl and (αl + δl) =
ρL−(1−ps)βlw
ps(Rs(L)+w)
. There exists pls






l = w. S
uu = Suf = Su
and
Sul =
ρLl − (1− ps)w +W (cl)
ps




l , Ll) = psU
u
s (Rs(Ll)− Sul + w) + (1− ps)Uf ((1− βl)w) ≥
prU
u
r (Rr(Ll)− Sul + w) + (1− pr)Uf ((1− βl)w)− cl = V lr (Skl , Ll)− cl
In order to show that a given βl is optimal, I only need to show that it relaxes
the incentive constraint as much as possible as ps → 1 , since the left-hand side
is the objective function.
lim
ps→1




[(1− ps)Uus w − (1− ps)Uf w] = 0
lim
ps→1







(1− ps)Uur w − (1− pr)Uf w] = −(1− pr)Uf w < 0
Therefore, there exists a pls such that for ps > p
l
s the optimal value for βl is
βl = 1.
Sul follows from βl = 1 and the lender’s break-even constraint.
I rewrite lemma 3.2. The subscript g denotes the group contract.
38α can include both the portion of the income paid to the lender and the portion paid to
borrower two.
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Lemma 7.2. There exists pgs such that for ps > p
g
s, βg = 1, γg = 1, δg = 0, and
αg = 1. Therefore, Sfug = Sffg = w, Sufg = Rs(Lg) +w and
Suug =
ρLg − (1− p2s)w − ps(1− ps)Rs(Lg)
p2s
Proof. The lender chooses βg, γg, δg, and αg to solve problem (5) given in section
3.3. Consider the group incentive compatibility constraint, in which I substitute
in from the constraint which determines cg,
Vss(S
k
g , Lg)−W (cg) = p2sUuus (Rs(Lg)− Suug + w) + ps(1− ps)Uufs (Rs(Lg) + w −
αg(Rs(Lg) + w)) + ps(1− ps)Ufus ((1− γg)w + δg(Rs(Lg) + w)) +
(1− ps)2Uff ((1− βg)w)−W [prpsUuur (Rr(Lg)− Suug + w) +
pr(1− ps)Uufr (Rr(Lg)− αg(Rs(Lg) + w) + (1− pr)psUfur ((1− γg)w +
δ(Rs(Lg) +w)) + (1− pr)(1− ps)Uff ((1− βg)w)−
p2sU
uu
s (Rs(Lg)− Suug + w)− ps(1− ps)Uufs (Rs(Lg) + w −
αg(Rs(Lg) + w))− ps(1− ps)Ufus ((1− γg)w + δg(Rs(Lg) + w))−
( 1− ps)2Uff ((1− βg)w)] ≥
p2rU
uu
r (Rr(Lg)− Suug + w) + pr(1− pr)Uufr (Rr(Lg)−
αg(Rs(Lg) + w)) + pr(1− pr)Ufur ((1− γg)w + δg(Rs(Lg) + w)) +
( 1− pr)2Uff ((1− βg)w) = Vrr(Skg , Lg)
In order to show that a particular value of βg, γg, αg, or δg is optimal, it suﬃces
to show that it relaxes the incentive constraint as much as possible as ps → 1,












(1− ps)2wUuur − (1− pr)(1− ps)wUff  −










(1− ps)2wUuur − (1− pr)2wUff ]
= −(1− pr)2Uf w < 0
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Increasing βg relaxes the incentive constraint. Therefore, there exists a p
βg
s such
that for ps ≥ p
βg








[ ps(1− ps)wUuus − ps(1− ps)wUfus −
W (pr(1− ps)wUuur − (1− pr)pswUfur −
ps(1− ps)wUuus + ps(1− ps)wUfus )]










ps(1− ps)wUuur − pr(1− pr)wUfur ]
= −pr(1− pr)wUfur < 0
Therefore, for ps larger than some p
γg








[ (Rs(Lg) + w)[ps(1− ps)Uuus − ps(1− ps)Uuf s −
W (pr(1− ps)Uuur − pr(1− ps)Uuf r −










ps(1− ps)Uuur − pr(1− pr)Uuf r ]]
= −(Rs(Lg) + w)pr(1− pr)Uuf r < 0
Therefore, for ps larger than some p
αg
s , α = 1 is optimal. Define pgs as the largest
of {pβgs , pγgs , pαgs }.
δg = 0 follows from αg = 1. Suug follows from the above and the lender’s
break-even constraint.
7.4. Proof of Proposition 4.1
Let V ∗n and V
∗
g be the utility in equilibrium when the borrower obtains an
individual-liability loan contract in which cl = 0 and a group loan contract,
respectively. Subscript n denotes the unmonitored, individual contract and sub-
script g denotes the group contract. a is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion.
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Proof. Using lemmas 7.1 and 7.2,
















ρL∗g − w − ps(1− ps)Rs(L∗g)
p2s
)−W (cg)
Consider w = ew for which V ∗n = V ∗g . I want to show that a exists such that






























s , because the payoﬀ in case of success must be larger in the group
contract in order for borrowers to be indiﬀerent. The payoﬀ occurs with a smaller
probability in the group contract and the borrowers are bearing a cost of moni-
toring.




dw . These are determined by the respective incentive constraints, since
both constraints bind. Suppose the group incentive constraint did not bind. Then
it would be optimal to insure the borrower. But this contradicts lemma 7.2. An
analogous argument shows that the unmonitored incentive constraint binds.
I first compare dLgdw and
dLn
dw ignoring the cost of monitoring. Implicitly diﬀer-


















































Uur )− (prRr(L)Uur − psRs(L)Uus )(Uuus −
p2r
p2s
Uuur ) > 0 (3)








∀L < L (4)
Inequality (3) holds if









Uuur ) ∀L < L (5)
and






Uuur ) ∀L < L (6)
Since Rr(L) > R













∀L < L (7)





To see this, note that when α = 1, for any given a, there is a non-degenerate
diﬀerence between Uus and U
uu
s . The argument of U
u
s is smaller than that of
Uur . As a→∞, the curvature of the utility function increases, and Uur becomes
small relative to (Uus − Uuus ).
For any a, inequality (4) holds if ρ is large enough. Therefore there exists an
















holds even if I take the cost of monitoring into ac-
count, if an increase in wealth and in loan size which just satisfy the unmoni-








































∀L < L (9)
This is the same inequality as (7), and it holds for a large enough. Therefore
there exists an a and ρ such that for all larger a and ρ, dLndw >
dLg
dw .







dw ). In order
to determine the sign of this term, I compare dLgdw

P=ps
ignoring the cost of
monitoring, as given by (1) and dLgdw

cg constant















∀L < L (10)
As a → ∞, the left-hand side approaches 1, since Uuf r > Uuur . Since Rs(L) <
Rr(L), the condition holds for a large enough. If this condition holds, then an
increase in the group loan with wealth which just satisfies the incentive constraint
ignoring the cost of monitoring, leaves cg lower than it was before the increase
in wealth. The overall incentive constraint does not bind after such a change
in Lg and the loan size will continue to increase. However, Lg cannot increase
suﬃciently to raise cg to the level it was at before the increase in wealth, because
in addition to raising cg, it also raises the utility from the risky project faster
than that from the safe project. Therefore the increase in wealth will leave cg










However, there exists a FC such that for FC > FC, W (c) is suﬃciently small




dw ) > 0
Then
∂V ∗g
∂w <
∂V ∗n
∂w .
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